Intergenerational Value Change and Transitions to Democracy: Toward the Consolidation of a Third Wave Generation? by Catterberg, Gabriela
intergenerational value change and 
transitions to democracy: 
toward the consolidation of a 
third wave generation?
Gabriela Catterberg1
Abstract: The American literature has extensively studied the 
dynamics of early political socialization and its impact on inter-
generational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1928; 
Jennings, Stoker and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011)� A key finding 
is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient 
historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political 
life� The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of 
early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly 
focused on historical events which transformed industrialized soci-
eties, identifying systematic differences in intergenerational values 
between pre-war and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart 
and Welzel, 2005)� However, the study of early political socialization 
in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and 
behaviors of individuals born and raised under these new demo-
cratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few 
exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar, 2010; Tessler, 2004, and 
Niemi, E� Catterberg et al., 1996)� I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of 
democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting 
impact on people’s political culture� Moreover, I argue that this impact 
did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor 
did it help consolidate a “3W Generation”, since post-honeymoon 
effects constrained the development of pro-democratic orientations 
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after regime change� To test these claims, I identify intergenerational 
differences among the 3W cohort and two older age groups after 
regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic politi-
cal culture: trust, tolerance and participation� I include established 
democracies as the control group, and compare trends in younger 
and established democracies among the same age groups� I use 
World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 −the year that most 
3W democracies experienced regime change− and 2005-2007 −the 
last wave that was available−� Finally, I test the generation effects 
hypothesis with regression analyses�
Introduction
Over two decades after the Third Wave (3W) of de-
mocratization expanded democracy into new countries 
throughout Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and 
South Asia, it is still unclear to what extent inter-generational 
value change has taken place, and how democratic the 
orientations of the younger generations are in comparison 
to those of their elders� Has a new political generation, the 
“Third Wave Generation”, emerged across new democracies? 
I believe this is a crucial component in understanding the 
survival and consolidation of democracy� 
The American literature has extensively studied the 
dynamics of early political socialization and their impact 
in intergenerational value differences since the early 1950s 
(Mannheim, 1952; Jennings and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 
2011)� A key finding is that the emergence of new political 
generations requires salient historical events that strongly 
affect socialization in early political life, such as the Big 
Wars, the Cold War and the Vietnam War� The comparative 
literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experi-
ences in the formation of political attitudes, and has mostly 
focused on historical events that transformed industrialized 
societies during the pre- and post-war period, identifying 
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systematic differences in the intergenerational values of 
pre- and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart, 1997)� 
However, the study of early political socialization in Third 
Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and 
behavior of individuals born and raised under new demo-
cratic regimes has been mostly ignored� Among the very few 
exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar (2010); Tessler 
(2004), and Niemi, E� Catterberg et al. (1996)� 
Generational replacement presupposes the forma-
tive years hypothesis, a period of openness during which 
political orientations are formed (Schuman, 2011)� It as-
sumes the presence of life cycle effects as people ages 
in the formation and dynamics of political attitudes and 
behavior, and identifies attitudinal fluctuation (or instabil-
ity) mostly during late adolescence and early adulthood� 
Once formed, they tend to persist throughout people’s lives 
(Jennings, 2004)� Crucial to the formative years hypothesis 
is what Mannheim (1928) over half a century ago referred 
to as the stratification of experience� Although older and 
younger cohorts may experience the same new event, they 
do so differently because first experiences are not the same 
as those superimposed upon other earlier impressions� 
A fundamental implication is that “adult socio-political 
dispositions are strongly rooted in pre-adult experiences” 
(Inglehart, 1997: 41)�
In addition, the formative years hypothesis is a crucial 
pillar to understanding the process of constructing gen-
erational memory, and identifying its potential impact on 
future attitudes and actions� A generation is formed when 
unique events affect people of the same birth cohort at an 
early stage, shaping them in distinctive ways� As Schuman 
(2011: 3), puts it, “Belonging to a generation endows each 
of us with a place in the historical process, and this, in turn, 
limits us to a particular range of experiences, thoughts 
and actions”�
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What main factors shape pre-adult political experi-
ences? Parental transmission has been traditionally con-
sidered the most influential variable in an individual’s early 
political socialization� Since the publication of American 
Voter (1960), the values and predispositions of parents has 
been shown to significantly impact political identification� 
However, most recent studies indicate that, although influ-
ential, it is not necessarily the prevailing factor in the de-
velopment of critical socio-political orientations� Jennings 
conducted panel data research arriving at different conclu-
sions, depending on which specific political orientation 
was analyzed� Regarding party identification, vote choice, 
and interest in politics, Jennings et al. (2009: 795) argue that 
“parents can have an enormous degree of influence on the 
political learning that takes place in pre-adulthood”� Yet, in 
relation to social trust and civil engagement, Jennings and 
Stoker (2004: 355-356) conclude that their impact is much 
lower than expected traditionally� “Parents do appear to 
play a role in shaping the extent to which their children 
enter adulthood with trusting or distrusting dispositions, 
and in the extent to which they get involved in voluntary 
associations, both in high school and subsequently� Still, 
the magnitude of these family linkages are modest at best”�
As stated above, in both American and comparative 
literature, robust studies show that historic or period effects 
during late adolescence and early adulthood may have a 
significant impact on the formation of an individual’s most 
rooted beliefs� Important political events define what is 
salient and significant for young people as they first face 
the larger political world� Such events, however, are usu-
ally less important for adults, who tend to assimilate new 
experiences into an attitudinal framework that is already 
well developed, and have lived their formative years un-
der different historical circumstances� This socialization 
process produces distinct cohorts or political generations 
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which attitudinally and behaviorally respond in a similar 
fashion to new political events� In other words, when a new 
political generation does emerge, shared attitudes should 
be identifiable among the age cohort that experienced the 
same events in formative years� 
American literature identifies three main political gen-
erations during the XX century (Jennings and Stoker, 2004)� 
The pre-war generation spent at least part of their pre-adult 
years during the Depression with nearly three fifths of the 
males serving in WWII; during adulthood, it experienced 
the post-war boom and the beginning of the cold war as 
adults� This generation is usually characterized as the “civic 
generation” because of its strong civic commitment� The 
post-war generation, or “baby boomers”, spent their early 
years during the domestic tranquility and prosperity of 
the 50s� However critical events such as the Civil Rights 
Movement, the Vietnam War and Watergate shaped their 
pre-adult period, and they became the “protest generation”� 
For Americans coming of age in the 1980s and 1990s, unlike 
for previous generations “history possesses little by way of 
defining historical moments” that could define a specific 
political identity�
The comparative literature shows a post-materialist 
shift between pre- and post-war cohorts in established 
democracies (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005)� 
The high levels of prosperity and existential security dur-
ing individuals’ formative years were conducive to the 
emergence of the pro-democratic values that characterize 
post-war cohorts� Rising levels of economic and physical 
security led to increasingly higher levels of tolerance, trust, 
and mass participation among younger generations� 
However, research on democratization has paid little 
attention to the effects of early socialization on the possible 
emergence of a “Third Wave Generation”� Is the young-
est generation in younger democracies growing up with 
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orientations different from those of their elders? Are these 
orientations supportive of democracy? Prior research has 
shown mixed trends� 
On the one hand, research on the trajectories of politi-
cal orientations in new democracies after regime change 
over time uncovers a worrisome trend that calls into ques-
tion both the impact of the 3W political socialization on 
people’s democratic orientations and the emergence of 
new generations� On average, political participation and 
trust in new democracies declined in the years following 
regime change, while tolerance toward élite corruption 
and detachment with the law increased (Catterberg and 
Moreno, 2006; Catterberg & Zuasnabar, 2010; Uslaner, 2004)� 
There are elements peculiar to the dynamics of demo-
cratic transitions that usually affect people’s expectations 
about the effectiveness of new administrations, ultimately 
leading to skepticism� During the 3W, the original belief 
among the publics −often reinforced by élite discourse− that 
democracy not only provides civil liberties but also improves 
economic well-being was a crucial factor in motivating 
these high expectations� If the economy subsequently per-
formed poorly, disillusionment with democracy was likely� 
Moreover, the experience of living under an authoritarian 
regime engendered unrealistic expectations about democ-
racy and democratic politics� An increasing discrepancy 
between expectations and reality led to democratic disil-
lusionment, especially when some new regimes seemed 
incompetent� In the aftermath of the transition, a “post-
honeymoon effect” took place in most 3W democracies, as 
the immediate need for participation receded, the euphoria 
of democratization wore off, and political trust eroded −
particularly in cases where democratization brought severe 
disillusionment (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002)� 
Moreover, over two decades ago, authors such as Niemi 
et al. (1995) and E� Catterberg (1991) argued that, in contrast 
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to the “natural socialization hypothesis” usually presumed 
in established democracies, the inter-generational transmis-
sion of democratic values in 3W nations is uncertain: “In 
newer democracies, automatic transmission of democratic 
values from one generation to the next cannot be taken 
for granted …Older generations are themselves untutored 
about democratic processes, and they may fail to embrace 
democratic values or waiver in their own commitment 
to them” (Niemi et al., p� 465)� In the Southern Cone of 
Latin America, an absence of democratic values among 
the adult population was identified from the early stages 
of democratization� Based on surveys conducted during 
the military regime and after the transition to constitu-
tional government, E� Catterberg noted, “during the first 
five years of the constitutional government [responses 
on] many libertarian dimensions moved backward” (1991: 
107-108)� Not surprisingly, the emergence of a political 
generation is an infrequent phenomenon� In addition, for 
some transformative events, the main distinction might be 
between those who were deeply affected at any point in the 
life course and those born in subsequent years who had no 
direct experience at all (Schuman, 2011)� As Tessler (2004: 
188) concludes, “political generations are relatively rare”�
On the other hand, some factors suggest that people 
may have adopted more democratic orientations, at least 
in some dimensions, and especially among younger age 
groups� The 3W of democratization, contrary to many po-
litical events that are not highly salient −or even if they are 
salient, erode rapidly− dramatically transformed people’s 
everyday lives� And although these transformations did not 
follow a relatively linear and stable process, they tended 
to have a lasting impact on the economic and political 
organizations of most societies� Despite differences across 
countries, an almost universal fact about the 3W is that 
it brought more openness in both formal and informal 
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institutional settings, greater freedom of expression and 
assembly as well as new exposure to independent me-
dia (see, for instance, Freedom House civil liberties and 
political rights indices)� As Huntington pointed out in a 
1997 article, “A quarter-century ago, authoritarian govern-
ments −communist politburos, military juntas, or personal 
dictatorships− were the rule� Today, hundreds of millions 
of people who previously suffered under tyrants live in 
freedom” (p� 3)�
In this context, I argue that the 3W was a transformative 
experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political 
attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, I argue that this impact 
did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orienta-
tions nor the consolidation of a “Third Wave Generation” 
since opposite effects influenced their trajectories after regime 
change� On one hand, socialization processes during a 
transition towards democracy are expected to promote the 
development of political attitudes and behaviors that are 
more democratic and pluralist, especially among those born 
and raised in the new institutional settings� On the other 
hand, post-honeymoon effects are expected to constrain 
this development by increasing political disillusionment 
and dissatisfaction� In addition, the development of genera-
tional replacement may also have brought about the weak 
intergenerational transmission of democratic values and the 
likely impact of direct experience with the dramatic politi-
cal transformations across different age groups� Therefore, 
I expect some key pro-democratic orientations to become 
strengthened as the result of social interaction within the 
new openness and freedom, while others may weaken as 
the result of increasing disillusionment toward the new re-
gimes and fragile parental diffusion� In particular, I focus on 
three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: 
trust, tolerance and participation� Finally, I expect that the 
same age groups in established democracies −where the 
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critical distinction among political generations is between 
pre- and post-war cohorts− experienced more stability (or 
lower attitudinal change rates) during 3W years�
To analyze these expectations, I studied the trajectories 
of political trust, political participation and tolerance toward 
diversity after regime change in both 3W democracies and 
established democracies� I tested the “generation effects 
hypothesis” with regression analysis� I used World Values 
Surveys (WVS) data to explore these issues from 1990 −
the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime 
change− and 2005-2007− its last wave available�2 More 
than 25 years after Raúl Alfonsín took office in Argentina, 
the temporal simultaneity between 3W democratization 
and the implementation of the WVS project allowed us 
to study the impact of political socialization in recently 
democratized contexts over time� This simultaneity was 
not merely coincidental; rather, it evidenced at the time 
the new openness experienced by more than 30 nations 
across the globe�
Trust, Tolerance, Participation and Democracy 
Political trust, political tolerance and political partici-
pation are intrinsically linked to democracy�
Political trust refers to citizens’ confidence in political 
institutions� Trust is especially important for democratic 
2 The WVS has been conducted in about 80 societies in different waves 
of interviews between 1981 and 2005, including new and established 
democracies, as well as non-democratic countries� The first wave took 
place in 1981-83, followed by a second in 1990, a third in 1995-96, and 
a fourth in 2000-01� A fifth wave was conducted in 2005-07� The next 
wave will be complete by the end of 2012� In 1990, the WVS expanded 
from 21 to 45 nations, incorporating almost 20 countries undergoing 
transitional processes�
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governments since they cannot rely on coercion to the 
same extent as other regimes� During periods of economic 
turmoil, for instance, democratic stability requires citizens 
to have sufficient trust in economic and political institu-
tions to accept temporary economic hardship in return 
for the promise of better economic conditions at some 
uncertain future time� 
Successful democracies are driven by high levels of 
trust in other people as well as in government� In a well-
ordered society “everyone accepts and knows that the 
others accept the same principles of justice, and the basic 
social institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy these 
principles” (Rawls, 1971: 454, in Uslaner, 2004: 2)� 
Tolerance is a critical value to socialize and internalize 
for democratic functioning and survival� As Sartori argues 
(2001), pluralism −the “genetic code of an open society”− 
presupposes and requires high doses of tolerance� While 
pluralism asserts that diversity and dissent are values that 
improve the individual and also his or her political city, 
those who tolerate concede that others have the right to 
their “wrong beliefs”� In new democracies, an underlying 
culture of tolerance is crucial to developing the legitimacy 
that enables political institutions to weather difficult times 
(Inglehart, 2003: 54)� In particular, “tolerance or intoler-
ance of homosexuals, although it does not overtly refer to 
support for democracy, provides a substantially stronger 
predictor of the degree to which democratic institutions 
exist than does any question that explicitly asks how one 
feels about democracy”�
Finally, political participation points to activity that has 
the intent of affecting or influencing government action� 
Political participation impacts governmental decisions 
either directly by affecting the making or implementation 
of public policy, or indirectly by influencing the selec-
tion of people who will make those policies (Verba et al., 
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1995)� In a democracy, citizens channel their demands 
and expectations through political participation� Very low 
political participation due to disillusionment and discontent 
(rather than exceptionally widespread political satisfaction) 
weakens critical pillars of communication between the citi-
zenry and the political élite� In particular, when a feeling of 
hopelessness with respect to the political system dominates, 
inactivity is more likely than action to take place� On the 
other hand, if an implicit trust in democratic mechanisms 
to canalize people’s demands prevails, the likelihood of 
participation increases substantially (Catterberg, 2003)� 
methodological considerations
I define the 3W cohort (C3) as respondents born after 
1965 in the WVS data set, in other words, people who were 
25 years old or younger in 1990, the year of regime change� 
For analytical purposes, I distinguish those born between 
1965 and 1974 from those born between 1975 and 1990, and 
focus the analysis on the former� Since the latter were too 
young to be included in the 1990 surveys, this distinction 
prevents us from comparing non-equivalent populations 
over time� 
In addition to the 3W cohort, and in order to effec-
tively identify intergenerational value change from overall 
attitudinal shifts, I also include two older cohorts in this 
study: respondents born between 1945-1964 (who were 26 
to 45 years old in 1990, C2) and those between 1925-1944 
(who were between 46 and 65 years old in 1990, C1)� The 
1901-1924 cohort is not included because given the small 
number of cases, the results are not statistically significant� 
The WVS dataset contains much more data than that 
utilized in this paper, but the data and questions available 
for the same countries in both 1990 and 2005 reduced the 
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number of countries I could analyze to twenty-four: thirteen 
young democracies and eleven established democracies� 
The younger democracies are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Chile, East Germany, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
South Korea, Slovenia and Turkey� Older democracies are 
Britain, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, USA, and West Germany� Each national 
representative sample includes about 1,200 face-to-face in-
terviews, though sample sizes vary from country to country� 
Most surveys were conducted in populations over eighteen, 
although in some surveys the age range started at fifteen�3 
To estimate political trust, I use a measure of “confi-
dence in parliament”� Other political institutions inquired 
about in the same battery were not available for all countries 
in the two waves included in this study� To measure politi-
cal participation, I constructed an index that indicates the 
percentage of the publics that responded having engaged in 
at least one of the following three forms of élite-challenging 
activities: signing a petition, attending a lawful demon-
stration or joining a boycott� This participation index is a 
dichotomy variable: 1 indicates that the respondent par-
ticipated in at least one of these three political activities, 
while 0 indicates that he or she did not participate in any of 
these actions� To estimate tolerance toward diversity, I use 
a battery of questions on predispositions toward different 
minorities (“On this list are various groups of people, could 
you please point out any that you would not like to have 
as neighbors?”)� Based on these questions, I constructed 
a tolerance index that is the sum of opinions toward five 
3 The year of regime change corresponds to the year of fieldwork in young 
democracies, with the exception of Argentina, where regime change took 
place before most 3W democracies, in December 1983� In the case of 
Peru, data for 1990 is not available, and in the cases of Brazil, Poland and 
Sweden the data sets for 1990 have limited variables� In these countries, 
I used 1995 data�
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groups that are generally stigmatized: people of a different 
race, immigrants or foreign workers, homosexuals, drug 
addicts and people with AIDS� The tolerance index is an 
ordinal additive measure on a scale from 0 to 5, in which 0 
indicates high intolerance toward diversity, while 5 indicates 
high tolerance toward diversity� In other words, the lower 
limit of the Index refers to respondents explicitly mention-
ing that “they would not like to have as neighbors” anyone 
belonging to any of the five minorities, while the upper limit 
refers to respondents who do not point out any group as 
undesirable potential neighbors� Intermediate values show 
ambivalent orientations toward the acceptance of minori-
ties as likely residents of their communities�
Age Group Changes over Time in Trust, 
Participation and Tolerance
By identifying critical variations between the year of 
regime change (1990) and the latest WVS wave available 
(2005-2007) in both younger and established democra-
cies, this section analyzes the extent to which generational 
change took place among younger and older age groups in 
their orientations toward trust, tolerance and participation 
during the 3W of democratization� I focus on the rate of 
change of each variable in all cohorts between 1990 and 
2005-2007 to identify systematic age group differences over 
time� Overall, variations in trust, participation and toler-
ance adopted very distinct trajectories in 3W democracies, 
when compared with established ones. 
Trust in parliament experienced a decrease in 3W 
countries, affecting all three age groups: among the younger 
cohorts (those born between 1945-1964 and 1965-1974) it 
dropped almost 40%, among the eldest it fell even further, 
by 45%� In twelve countries, and across all age groups, 
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there was a decrease in the percentage of people express-
ing confidence in parliament� Political trust is intrinsically 
unstable because is highly sensitive to governmental per-
formance and is especially affected by post-honeymoon 
effects during democratization (Catterberg and Moreno, 
2006)� As the next section suggests, this higher sensitivity 
to short term factors, such as poor economic performance, 
constrained the generation of greater political trust despite 
the dramatic political transformations of the 3W� More than 
a decade later, a considerable, persistent decline took place� 
There was also a decrease in established democracies but 
it was significantly smaller (11%), mostly among the eldest 
cohort� The 1945-1964 cohort remained constant, while 
the variation in the youngest cohort was almost marginal�
Table 1
Political Trust over Time
Trust in Parliament by Age Cohort in 1990 and 2005
% saying they trust "quite a lot" and "a great deal"
           1925-1944 (C1)            1945-1964 (C2)            1965-1974 (C3)
1990 2005-2007 1990 2005-2007 1990      2005-2007
Established Democracies
Britain 47 34 41 31 34 36
Finland 41 52 29 57 30 54
France 43 30 44 25 46 33
Italy 32 32 28 31 32 35
Japan 36 31 24 21 19 11
Netherlands 50 58 52 53 57 50
Spain 40 55 37 52 30 48
Sweden 47 51 41 57 44 49
Switzerland na na na na na na
US 49 19 34 18 45 21
W.Germany 54 29 44 24 42 32
mean 44 39 37 37 38 37
3W Democracies
Argentina 19 15 14 12 15 11
Brazil 40 22 34 25 29 27
Bulgaria 50 21 44 24 49 13
Chile 62 29 67 25 58 26
E.Germany 46 15 37 15 32 17
Mexico 37 21 32 28 36 27
Peru 15 5 14 9 14 6
Poland 33 13 30 11 27 11
Romania 25 18 18 17 17 17
Russia 50 20 37 18 34 22
S.Korea 44 35 32 27 25 19
Slovenia 36 18 37 18 26 13
Turkey 65 68 53 59 51 56
mean 42 23 36 22 33 20
1995 wave used for Sweden, Brazil, Peru, and Poland
Source: World Values Surveys
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The Political Participation Index shows the overall pat-
tern of change in participation from 1990 to 2005� In most 
new democracies during the years after regime change, 
there was a contraction of political action, a similar trend 
to that of political trust� The percentage of respondents 
who declared having signed a petition, joined a boycott or 
attended a rally fell equally in all age groups (on average, 
11%)� Despite this overall decline, there were contrasting 
trends at the country level� Three South American coun-
tries −Argentina, Brazil and Peru− experienced important 
upward shifts, yet they were offset by larger negative varia-
tions in the other 3W nations� 
As with political trust, the decrease in political par-
ticipation is associated with a post-honeymoon decline� 
The struggle for democracy motivated the organization of 
ordinary men and women into a variety of groups, which 
collectively had the effect of “aiding the assaults on the 
seats of power”� Post-transitional problems −especially the 
combination of rising aspirations of economic well-being 
and persisting inequality− led to declining participation 
rates in most 3W countries, especially in the years im-
mediately after regime change (Inglehart and Catterberg, 
2002)� In established democracies on the other hand, an 
increase took place, especially among the youngest co-
hort, who experienced a 20% variation� Despite a growing 
body of literature which describes a decline in political 
activism in post-industrial societies, the findings indicate 
that the upward tendency of protest politics −predicted by 
the post-material shift hypothesis− produced a sustained, 
systematic increase in élite-challenging activities during 
the 1990-2005 period�
In younger democracies, involvement in political par-
ticipation experienced a practically identical negative shift 
across age groups, although it was higher among C2 and 
C3� Therefore, life cycle effects were probably not a critical 
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factor in this decline� In established democracies, visible 
increases occurred in both the eldest and the youngest 
cohorts especially� In particular, C2 and C3 reached the 
highest inter-age group variation of all three variables� 
Therefore, formative years effects are evidently in play 
since respondents who were in their late adolescence and 
early adulthood underwent the most significant changes 
between 1990 and 2005�
Table 2
Participation over Time
Participation Index by Age Cohort in 1990 and 2005
% saying they participated in at least one elite-challenging activity
           1925-1944 (C1)            1945-1964 (C2)           1965-1974 (C3)
1990 2005-2007 1990 2005-2007 1990      2005-2007
Established Democracies
Britain 67 72 75 71 75 68
Finland 15 38 28 54 23 65
France 53 68 60 71 46 72
Italy 41 48 54 57 52 64
Japan 53 46 54 49 29 35
Netherlands 44 37 62 49 45 52
Spain 21 27 39 39 41 44
Sweden 64 67 82 81 78 80
Switzerland na na na na na na
US 69 84 71 77 51 71
W.Germany 53 39 68 55 69 60
mean 48 53 59 60 51 61
3W Democracies
Argentina 19 22 20 35 18 38
Brazil 44 47 52 57 52 65
Bulgaria 16 10 30 19 34 16
Chile 28 23 33 23 34 23
E.Germany 70 41 83 55 82 59
Mexico 40 29 41 34 38 23
Peru 28 33 21 42 26 37
Poland 19 17 25 27 27 29
Romania
Russia 33 26 46 19 41 16
S.Korea 30 31 35 37 49 45
Slovenia 20 23 32 34 33 34
Turkey 11 10 16 13 14 15
mean 30 26 36 33 37 33
1995 wave used for Sweden, Brazil, Peru and Poland
Source: World Values Surveys
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In sharp contrast with trust in parliament and political 
participation, tolerance of diversity significantly increased in 
younger democracies across all age groups� As the Tolerance 
Index shows, this positive shift in respondents expressing 
more acceptance toward people of different race, homo-
sexuals, foreign workers, drug addicts or people with AIDS 
was similar among the three cohorts: reaching an average of 
24%� All countries experienced increases within the eldest 
cohorts, as well as within C1 and C2, except for Slovenia 
and Turkey� Again, the acceptance levels were similar to 
those of most established democracies in two Southern 
Cone countries, Argentina and Brazil, and in many cases 
even higher�
This is a significant change, not only because it affected 
all countries and age groups but also because the nature that 
characterizes attitudes toward tolerance is usually stable� On 
the other hand, in established democracies, there was little 
overall change� The Tolerance Index remained practically 
constant in most nations and across age groups, largely 
because the rising tolerance of homosexuality was offset 
by a rise in the rejection of foreign workers� 
Changes in tolerance toward diversity were almost 
marginal in both younger and established democracies� 
Therefore, no life cycle effects appeared to be involved in 
these variations either� Yet in both groups of nations, the 
younger generations expressed more tolerance toward 
others than did older generations, reaching a 14-point dif-
ference with the eldest cohort� This shift suggests that the 
process of intergenerational change may tend to elevate 
tolerance in the long run� 
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Table 3
Tolerance of Diversity over Time
Tolerance Index by Age Cohort in 1990 and 2005
% "tolerants"
           1925-1944 (C1)              1945-1964 (C2)              1965-1974 (C3)
1990 2005-2007 1990 2005-2007 1990      2005-2007
Established Democracies
Britain 57 58 68 76 79 73
Finland 55 54 63 68 49 73
France 65 32 75 51 82 59
Italy 43 47 58 61 61 69
Japan na na na na na na
Netherlands 71 73 87 80 84 84
Spain 49 75 67 80 70 79
Sweden 82 84 88 96 94 93
Switzerland 97 78 98 84 98 89
US 55 51 60 68 53 69
W.Germany 53 64 67 78 74 73
mean 63 62 73 74 75 76
3W Democracies
Argentina 52 71 64 89 74 88
Brazil 69 66 71 74 77 79
Bulgaria 24 32 22 37 25 38
Chile 42 50 45 59 45 62
E.Germany 56 68 68 79 65 74
Mexico 21 55 34 57 31 67
Peru 38 44 38 47 42 53
Poland 22 26 32 41 43 46
Romania 17 32 23 34 33 42
Russia 14 19 18 22 21 23
S.Korea na na na na na na
Slovenia 41 35 38 56 35 71
Turkey 5 5 5 4 9 5
mean 33 42 38 50 42 54
1995 wave used for Sweden, Brazil, Peru, and Poland
Source: World Values Surveys
Finally, did 3W and established democracies converge 
during 1990 and 2005? Or, on the contrary, were differences 
accentuated? As previously mentioned, distinct trajectories 
characterized both groups in most variables� In other words, 
the findings identify a clear tendency toward divergence 
fifteen years after regime change, when the gaps in “trust” 
and “participation” between the two groups of countries 
increased� Established democracies more than doubled 
their levels of political trust and political participation of 
3W democracies across all age groups, while the discrep-
ancies in tolerance were still significant but smaller� The 
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differences between the youngest cohorts in 2005 show 
the magnitude of the divergence: trust in parliament was 
37% versus 20%, and political participation was 61% versus 
33%� Tolerance of diversity, despite its reduction, showed 
a 20-point difference, 76% versus 56%� 
Although trust in parliament fell in both established 
and younger democracies, it displayed significantly differ-
ent shifts, increasing the distance between 12 to 14 points 
across age cohorts� Political participation followed a similar 
pattern to that of trust in parliament, reaching a 28-point 
difference� Yet because there were strong variations in 
levels of participation among 3W nations, these differ-
ences were visibly lower in South American countries� On 
the other hand, differences in tolerance decreased in all 
age groups from 8 to 10 points� In some new democracies 
younger generations still show very low levels of tolerance, 
especially in Turkey, where less than 5% expressed high 
levels of tolerance� 
A “Generation effects” model
To test for generational effects, I estimated multivari-
ate regressions of political trust, political participation and 
tolerance toward diversity in the thirteen 3W democracies 
included in this study� More specifically, the regressions 
allowed me to identify if there were distinguishable and 
durable age group effects on political attitudes fifteen years 
after democratization took place� I used the 1990-1991 and 
2005-2007 waves of the World Values Surveys� As mentioned 
above, the former coincides with regime change in most 
countries, while the latter is the most recent WVS data 
available� As I claim in the introduction, increasing disil-
lusionment with poor economic performance and weak 
generational replacement are expected to erode political 
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trust and political participation� On the other hand, in-
tergenerational value change is expected to be associated 
with higher levels of tolerance� 
To measure the dependant variables, I used the same 
indicators analyzed in the previous section: confidence 
in parliament, the political participation index and the 
tolerance index� To measure generational effects, I used 
the same age cohort variable, which distinguishes those 
born between 1965 and 1974 (the 3W cohort, C3), from 
those born between 1945 and 1965 (C2) and between 1925 
and 1944 (C1)� To capture the full effect of age cohort, I 
introduced an interaction variable (“cohort*year”) that 
measures changes on the impact of “cohort” over time� 
In other words, this interaction tells us if belonging to a 
specific age group produced differentiated effects on trust, 
participation or tolerance in 1990 and 2005� Given that no 
direct question on economic performance is asked in the 
World Values Survey, in order to estimate this dimension, 
I used satisfaction with one’s economic well being: How 
satisfied are you with the financial situation of your house-
hold?� For socio-demographical variables, I only included 
gender, given that education was not inquired about in 
many countries in the 1990 wave and income correlates 
with the self-income report� I also included a variable that 
identifies the different countries and a dummy variable 
for time to control for autocorrelation among a nation’s 
different surveys� 
Since the dependent variables are dummy and ordi-
nal indices, I used probit (for participation) and ordered 
probit estimations (for trust and tolerance)� To control for 
fluctuations on the variance across samples, I incorporated 
robust standard errors� I also weighed the estimations by 
population size for pooled analyses� An overview of the 
results of the multivariate analyses is shown in Table 4� 
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Table 4
Generation Effects Model in Thirteen 3W Democracies
Cohort Influence on Trust, Participation and Tolerance
Trust in Parliament Political Participation Index Tolerance of Diversity Index
cohort .- .0975 * 0.0723 * 0.0929 *
(.0132) (.0137) (.01034)
cohort*year .0684 * -0.0269 * 0.0354 *
(.0194) (.0061) (.0047)
financial satisfaction 0.0467 * 0.0476 * 0.0245 *
(.0029) (.0038) (.0029)
gender 0.0569 *
(.0145)
year .-.5570 *
(.0600)
country .0210 * -0.0332 * .0576 *
(.0018) (.0019)
X2 977.26 * 433.2 1264.92 *
N 25,157 22,073 26,044
*p<.001 
Note : Regressions produced probit and ordinal probit estimations, with robust standard errors. Estimations were weighted
in order to produce a N of 1,200 for each survey.
Nations  included: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, East Germany, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Turkey
Romania, Russia, South Korea, Slovenia and Turkey. 
Source: 1990 and 2005 World Values Survey
“Trust in Parliament” is negatively impacted by “co-
hort”: the younger the age group, the lower the propensity 
to trust� The interaction variable also affects “trust”, this 
means that the effect of cohort on confidence in parliament 
changed between 1990 and 2005� Yet, its negative coefficient 
implies a significant reduction on the full impact of cohort� 
When the two coefficients are added, their effect is almost 
marginal (-0�03)� In terms of probabilities, the propensity to 
trust among respondents who said they trusted parliament 
“quite a bit” decreased from 27% in C1 to 22% in C3� When 
the full effect is considered, these probabilities are lower 
than 10% in both age groups� In the year of regime change, 
the 1965-1974 cohort expressed a smaller propensity to trust 
74 Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 3
than their elders, yet in 2005, the impact of being raised 
during democratization was visibly weakened� As described 
in the previous section, respondents aged 46 to 65 in the 
year of regime change experienced even a stronger decline 
than younger cohorts in their level of confidence −all three 
age groups showed remarkably low levels of trust in 2005−� 
In contrast, “financial satisfaction” raises the propensity 
to trust� Respondents who are more satisfied with their 
household income tend to trust parliament more: among 
unsatisfied respondents the probability of trusting parlia-
ment “quite a bit” is 22%; this figure rises to 31% among 
the financially satisfied� 
Unlike trust in parliament, “Political Participation” is 
positively impacted by “cohort”: the younger age groups 
tend to participate more than the older ones� The term of 
interaction is also significant and presents an opposite ef-
fect� Consequently, as in the case of trust, it visibly reduces 
the full impact of cohort (0�045) on the propensity to be 
involved in at least one political activity� The probabilities of 
C1 and C3, among those who participated, increased from 
20 to 25%� The total effect is also lower than 10% for both 
age groups� Put differently, in the year of regime change, 
C3’s propensity to participate was greater than that of the 
older cohort, but this difference was weakened 15 years 
later� As shown above, all cohorts decreased their level of 
participation, although to a lesser degree than they did in 
“trust”� As expected, financially satisfied respondents tend 
to participate more� The associated probabilities among 
those who participate are practically the same as than its 
effect on trust −20% and 32% among unsatisfied and satis-
fied respondents respectively−�
Unlike “trust” and “participation”, “tolerance” is posi-
tively impacted both by “cohort” and the term of interac-
tion� This implies, firstly, that the younger the age group to 
which an individual belongs, the more likely that he or she 
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will express high tolerance toward diversity� Secondly, it 
means that the full effect of cohort (0,128) was not dimin-
ished over time, on the contrary, it was reinforced fifteen 
years after regime change� The propensity to participate 
among tolerants increases from 36 to 44% when the cohort 
changes from C1 to C3� These probabilities tell us that age 
cohort affects a respondent’s propensity to trust� As previ-
ously mentioned, all cohorts experienced a positive shift 
in their level of tolerance, although the difference between 
age groups increased in 2005, reaching a difference of 
almost 15 points between the younger and older cohorts� 
Financial satisfaction also increases tolerance, and shows 
probabilities very similar to the cohort’s probabilities (38% 
and 46%)�
Discussion 
This paper raises two central questions: whether a new 
political generation −a “Third Wave Generation”− emerged 
across young democracies, and whether people born and 
raised after regime change were more democratic than their 
elders� I focused on three critical dimensions of a demo-
cratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation�
I examined age group changes over time in these di-
mensions, operationalized by trust in parliament, a political 
participation index and a tolerance toward diversity index, 
in new and established democracies� I expected “3W ef-
fects” if variations were clearly stronger in countries that 
underwent democratization; while a more stable path was 
expected in countries which had had decades of continu-
ous years of democracy by 1990� The data supported these 
expectations� Between regime change and 2005-2007, the 
publics of younger democracies experienced significant 
variations in their dispositions toward the three dimensions, 
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especially in people’s levels of political participation and 
tolerance� Conversely, the publics of established democra-
cies remained relatively stable, with the exception of their 
involvement in political activities, which experienced a 
visible shift� 
There were also different trends in the direction of 
change both between the two groups of countries and within 
each of them� In younger democracies, trust in parliament 
and participation experienced important declines; trust in 
others also decreased, but on a smaller scale� Tolerance, 
however, experienced a significant positive shift� In contrast, 
in established democracies, trust in others and tolerance 
remained practically constant; political trust showed a 
slight decrease but participation increased substantially, 
especially among the youngest population� This increase in 
political involvement supports Inglehart and Catterberg’s 
(2002) conclusion of over a decade ago: “Simply put, the 
claims that the publics of established democracies are 
becoming disengaged from civic life and apathetic are 
mistaken”�
The variations experienced by younger regimes suggest 
that 3W effects did in fact influence the development of 
political attitudes during democratic transitions� However, 
socialization under new democratic settings did not pro-
duce higher levels of political trust and political partici-
pation on average; showing worryingly low levels fifteen 
years after regime change. Political erosion increased, as 
post-honeymoon effects linked to increasing disillusion-
ment with economic performance set in throughout most 
newly democratized countries in Latin America, and Eastern 
and Central Europe� Weak intergenerational transmission 
of democratic values and the impact of direct experience 
with the striking transformations of regime change across 
all age groups might have constrained the surge of a new 
generation of democrats� 
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Nonetheless, the significant increase in tolerance does 
bring some hopeful signs for democratic consolidation� 
During the years since 1990, tolerance rose substantially 
in new democracies but only very slightly in established 
democracies� This finding suggests that democratization 
did in fact bring a more open society to certain extent, 
conducive to rising tolerance of diversity� As the genera-
tion effect models show, trust in parliament and political 
participation are explained by an individual’s financial sat-
isfaction, as proxy to economic performance, while cohort 
effects significantly diminish over time� On the other hand, 
tolerance is clearly affected by both economic satisfaction 
as well as generational effects� The probabilities obtained 
in the study tell us that, fifteen years after regime change, 
age cohort affects people’s propensity to tolerate� In other 
words, inter-generational value change did in fact take 
place in this dimension� Recent studies indicate that this 
upward shift in tolerance after regime change may be part of 
a broader trend of support for values of self-expression and 
individual freedom, especially among younger generations 
in newer regimes (Siemienska, Basañez and Moreno, 2010)� 
Overall, the findings show that the 3W of democratiza-
tion was a transformative event that had a lasting impact 
on people’s political attitudes and actions, although not 
necessarily in a pro-democratic direction, increasing the 
divergence between older and younger regimes in critical 
dimensions of their political culture� Moreover, there is not 
enough evidence, despite some age differences that did take 
place, to indicate the consolidation of a 3W Generation� 
Yet it is clear that the publics of new democracies have 
gradually become more tolerant, especially among younger 
cohorts, converging with the publics of established democ-
racies in this respect� This is ultimately good news for 3W 
democracies�
78 Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 3
References
Campbell, Angus, Philip E� Converse, Warren Miller and 
Donald Stokes (1960), The American 
Voter, New York, Wiley�
Catterberg, Edgardo (1991), Argentina Confronts Politics: 
Political Culture and Public Opinion 
in the Argentine Transition to Democracy, Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner�
Catterberg, Gabriela (2003), “Evaluations, Referents of 
Support, and Political Action in New 
Democracies”, International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology 44 (3), pp� 173-198, June�
Catterberg, Gabriela y Alejandro Moreno (2006), “The 
Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and 
Established Democracies”, en International Journal of 
Public Opinion Research 18 (1), pp� 31-48�
in New and Established Democracies”, with Alejandro 
Moreno, International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research, 18 (1), pp� 31-48.
Catterberg, Gabriela and Ignacio Zuasnabar (2010), “Youth, 
Values and Democracy: Exploring 
Tolerance toward Diversity among Third Wave Generations”, 
with Ignacio Zuasnabar, in Ronald Inglehart et al., 
Changing Human Beliefs and Values, 1981-2007, México 
DF, Siglo XXI�
Huntington, Samuel (1997), “After Twenty Years: The Future 
of the Third Wave”, Journal of 
Democracy 8 (4), pp� 3-12, October�
Inglehart, Ronald (2003), “How Solid is Cross Support for 
Democracy-and How Much Can We 
Measure It?”, Political Science and Politics 36, pp� 51-57, 
January�
Inglehart, Ronald (1997), Modernization and Post-
Modernization, Princeton: Princeton 
Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 3 79
University Press� 
Inglehart, Ronald and Gabriela Catterberg (2002), “Cultural 
Change and the Rise of Participatory 
Publics”, International Journal of Comparative Sociology 
44(1), pp� 300-316, March, 2003�
Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel (2005), 
Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, 
New York, Cambridge University Press�
Jennings, M� Kent and Laura Stoker (2004), “Social Trust 
and Civic Engagement across Time and 
Generations”, Acta Politica 39, pp� 342-379�
Jennings, M� Kent, Laura Stoker and Jake Bowers (2009), 
“Politics across Generations: Familiy 
Transmission Reexamined”, Journal of Politics 71 (3), pp� 
782-799�
Mannheim, Karl [1928] (1952), “The Problem of Generations”, 
in Essays on the Sociology of 
Knowledge, Paul Kecskemeti (ed�), pp� 276-320, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul�
Niemi, Richard, Edgardo Catterberg, Frank Bell, and Roxana 
Morduchowicz (1996), “Teaching 
Political Information and Democratic Values in a New 
Democracy: An Argentine Experiment”, Comparative 
Politics, pp� 465-476, July�
Niemi, Richard and Mary Hepburn (1995), “The Rebirth of 
Political Socialization”, Perspectives 
on Political Science 24, p� 1�
Rawls, John (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press�
Sartori, Giovanni (2001), La Sociedad Multiétnica. 
Pluralismo, Multiculturalismo, y 
Extranjeros, Madrid, Taurus�
Siemienska, Renata, Miguel Basanez and Alejandro Moreno 
(2010), “Generational Differences in 
80 Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 3
Support for Democracy and Free Market Economics: 
Evidence from New and Established Democracies” 
in Ronald Inglehart et al., Changing Human Beliefs 
and Values, 1981-2007, México DF, Siglo XXI�
Schuman, Howard and Amy Corning (2012), “Generational 
Memory and the Critical Period: 
Evidence for National and World Events”, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Spring, 76 (1), pp� 1-31�
Tessler, Mark, Carrie Konold and Megan Reif (2004), 
“Political Generations in Developing 
Countries� Evidence and Insights from Alegeria”, Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 68 (2), pp� 184-216�
Uslaner, Eric (2004), “Coping and Social Capital: The 
Informal Sector and the Democratic 
Transition”, paper prepared for the “Unlocking Human 
Potential: Linking the Formal and Informal Sectors 
Conference”, Helsinki, Finland, September 17-18�
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E� 
Brady (1995), Voice and Equality, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press�
